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INTRODUCTION

The State declares Petitioner's brief to be inadequate in its opening brief for
failing to cite to the record of the evidentiary hearing held pursuant to Petitioner's
post-conviction petition. {See State's brief p. 6). Petitioner thoroughly briefed the
facts and law as to his claims. Furthermore, the evidentiary hearing which formed the
basis of the trial court's findings is only germane to the extent that it supports, or fails
to support, the findings made by the court. In other words, it is the findings of the
trial court that are at issue, as the State concedes. {See State's brief p. 7).
In addition, Petitioner hereby replies to the State's concerns, raised in its
Response Brief, by providing herein the Statement of Fact again, this time with direct
citations to the Record instead of references to the exhibits to Petitioner's original
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. This does not constitute a substantive change to
the original appellate Brief nor to the lodged Reply brief where it is simply a
recitation of virtually the same Statement of Facts verbatim as that which was in
Petitioner's Petitioner Brief. This constitutes a direct reply to the State's Response
Brief where the reply brief is the mode through which a plaintiff may cure any defects
perceived and raised by a defendant in its response brief.
Thirdly, the State argues that Petitioner has not adequately demonstrated how
the trial court's findings are incorrect. {See State's brief p. 7). Petitioner does not
concede the State's claim, but will more clearly and specifically address exactly

which of the trial court's findings are unsubstantiated and, perhaps more importantly,
the flaw in the trial court's reasoning and analysis in arriving at its conclusion.
Fourthly, on the standard under which this Court is to review the trial court's
factual findings and conclusions of law, the parties agree. See Houskeeper v. State,
2008 UT 78, p 18, 197 P.3d 636, Thomas v. State, 2002 UT 128, p 4, 63 P.3d 672
(quoting Seel v. Van Der Veur, 971 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah 1998)) (the district court's
findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and its legal conclusions for correctness)
IL

ARGUMENT

A, PETITIONER MARSHALED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF THE
TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO CONDUCT AN ADEQUATE PLEA
COLLOQUY, OF PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO HAVE
UNDERSTOOD HIS PLEA AGREEMENT, AND OF THE ACTUAL
CONFLICT OF INTEREST THAT FORMER DEFENSE ATTORNEY
JOHN CAINE HAD WHEN REPRESENTING PETITIONER
/. Petitioner replies to State's concern that he did not cite adequately to the Record
Petitioner hereby provides his Statement of Facts again with more citations to
the Record as part of his direct reply to the State's argument in its Response Brief It
is of note that the State's Statement of Facts section comprises only three (3) pages
wherein the State does reference pages to the Record. However, after that, the State
bootstraps numerous other factual facts, which were not raised or cited to in its
Statement of Facts, throughout the rest of its Response Brief These other facts
contain no citations to the Record.

1)

Procedural History of Criminal Case No. 041902251 and the
Instant Case

On April 22, 2004, the State of Utah charged Petitioner with one count of
"Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child," a lst-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-404.1(3) (2003), for events alleged to have occurred between September 2003
and March 2004. (SeeR. 63.) This case was filed as No. 041902251. (SeeR.63.) On
November 1, 2005, the day trial was set for, Petitioner appeared before District Judge
P.G. Heffernan and entered a plea of "no contest" to one count of "Sexual Abuse of a
Minor," a 2d-degree felony. (See R. 88, 91, 109/15.; John Caine ("Caine") and Grant
W. P. Morrison ("Morrison") served as counsel retained by Petitioner. (See R. 192, at
14; 208, at 14.)
On January 10, 2006, Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year and not more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. (See R.
143.) This prison term was suspended where Petitioner was to serve one year in jail,
with work release if possible, and put on probation for 36 months. (See R. 143.) The
conditions of his probation included entering an agreement with AP&P and
compliance therewith, no committing violations of the law, being released to NUCCC
when a bed space becomes available and successfully completing that program,
complying with all Group "A" sex offender conditions, and having no contact with the
victim or her family. (See R. 145.)
On April 18,2006, Judge Pamela Heffernan revoked Petitioner's probation and

reinstated his stayed sentence of one to fifteen years to be served in Utah State Prison.
(See R. 178.) Hence, Petitioner is currently incarcerated in the Central Utah
Correctional Facility, in Gunnison, Utah.
On or about November 17, 2006, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief. (See R. 241.) On November 26, 2007, an evidentiary took place where
testimony and evidence was admitted in addition to the incorporation of Petitioner's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and exhibits as part of the record. On December
17, 2007, the parties submitted written closing arguments and proposed findings of
fact and law. On or about January 22, 2008, Judge Pamela Heffernan issued a final
order denying Petitioner's Petition on all claims.
2) Statement of Material Facts
I) FIRST CLAIM - Petitioner's Conviction Should be Reversed Because the
Trial Court Did Not Adequately Ensure Petitioner Was Entering the Plea
Voluntarily and Knowingly as Required under Utah R.Crim. P. Rule 11 and the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and Utah C o n s t . Art. I, § 7.
1.

During Petitioner's plea colloquy before Judge Pamela Heffernan, the court relied

heavily on Petitioner's "Statement of Petitioner in Support of Guilty Plea" to apprise it of
the voluntariness of the plea and to enter into the record Petitioner's understanding of the
constitutional rights he was waiving, his right to move to withdraw his plea, and the other
elements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. (See R. 104/23-25 108/1-15.) The court did not verbally inquire into the elements enumerated in Rule 11.
(See R. 104/23-25 - 108/1-15.) When asked whether Petitioner understood his plea

statement at first Petitioner expressed difficulty understanding his plea. (See R. 104/2325-108/1-15.) The court inquired of defense counsel what had been done to help him
understand, to which Caine replied he had read the statement to Petitioner "verbatim."
{See R. 104/23-25 - 108/1-15.)
2.

The bulk of the colloquy was actually conducted with Petitioner's defense

counsel, Caine, not Petitioner. (See R. 104/23-25 - 108/1-15.) The court relied on the
assertions of defense counsel that Petitioner understood the plea statement because it
had allegedly been read to him 'Verbatim" despite uncertainties raised in the

course of the plea colloquy. (feR. 104/22-25-105/1-11.)
3.

The court addressed eight questions directly to Petitioner. Of those eight, Caine

answered for Petitioner four times. (See R. 103/23-25 - 107/1-15.) The court did not
clarify Petitioner's counsel's contradictions and ambiguities when counsel was
assuring the court the entire plea statement had been read to Petitioner. (See R. 107/915.) The court asked Petitioner if he read had understood the plea statement, to which
Caine responded for Petitioner that he had read it to Petitioner. (R. 103/25; R. 104/12.) Although Caine conceded when he went over the plea agreement with Petitioner
"the [plea] statement wasn't there," he had read it "line for line" to Petitioner. (See R.
104/25; R., 143/1-2.) In fact, Caine had not read the plea agreement "verbatim" to
Petitioner but had only gone over the "basics" of it. (See R. 192, f5; R. 193, fflflO-12;
R. 198433.)

4.

The court asked Petitioner if he agreed with the factual statement in the plea

agreement, to which Caine answered "yes." (R. 107/2-4.) The court then asked
Petitioner whether he was satisfied with the advice he had gotten from his attorney to
which Caine did not allow Petitioner to answer but himself responded again in
Petitioner's stead by stating: "This is, I think an appropriate resolution in a very
difficult case, so - yes." (R. 107/21-25.) Then the court asked Petitioner if he
understood that if he violated the probation being recommended in the plea
agreement, that any statements recommending no prison "would not come into play"
anymore. (R. 108/5-9.) Again Caine did not allow or in any way prompt Petitioner to
answer the court, that is, for petitioner to assure the court personally that he
understood these things. (R. 108/10.) Caine quickly answered for Petitioner instead:
"He does." (R. 108/10; see also R. 194, f 14; R. 202, Tf6; R. 211,ffl[15-16;R. 218, ffl[45.) Hence, during half of the colloquy, the court accepted Caine's responses in place
of Petitioner answering himself.
5.

The incongruities between Caine's representation to Petitioner and what the

plea really involved are evidenced by the differences between the written plea
statement and the oral statements made at the entry of plea proceeding. (R. 91-96.)
The plea statement indicates that Petitioner was pleading "guilty" yet Petitioner stated
at the plea hearing that he was pleading "no contest." (R. 91-96.)
6.

Another incongruity goes to whether Petitioner was admitting to the elements

of the crime he was pleading to or not. On the one hand, the "Statement of Petitioner

in Support of Guilty Plea" contends that Petitioner supposedly admitted to touching a
"child under the age of 14 on the vaginal area for purposes of gratifying a sexual
desire." (R. 91-96.) Yet, on the other hand, at the plea hearing the "factual basis" was
devoid of sexual intent and indicated the State must show that there was a substantial
risk of conviction in the case: "[T]he allegation of the victim is that he picked her up,
placed her on his lap, put his hand down the front of her pants on the bare skin, and
touched her genitals." (R. 99,ffif6-7,19-21; R. 108/17-19.) Any admission to the
"allegation" is also wholly absent at the hearing. It is no small wonder that Petitioner
did not know he was admitting to the factual elements of "Sexual Abuse of a Child."
(R. 192,18.)
7.

Petitioner only finally gave a one-word indication to the court that he understood

the plea statement because his own attorney kept speaking up for him prior to that, he
was intimidated by the court proceedings he did not understand, by his attorney's
admonitions before hand that he was too stupid to understand, and by the fact he did not
want to embarrass his attorney by contradicting counsel's having said he read the plea
statement to Petitioner "verbatim" when he did not. {See R. 193,fflflO-12;R. 209, ^14.)
8.

Petitioner could not have understood the factual basis of his no-contest plea as

his counsel promised him he was not admitting to the facts of the crime with which he
was charged. {See R. 193,ffljlO-12;R. 209,1[14.)
9.

In the course of Petitioner's defense, Caine made statements indicating he thought

that Petitioner was "stupid." (R. 193,ffljlO-13;see also R. 191-200.) Caine and

Morrison remarked haughtily several times that Petitioner was too slow mentally to
understand many procedures and treated Petitioner as if he were too stupid to understand
his advice. (R. 193, 1ffil0-l3; R. 209,ffl[8-10; R. 115/17-23.) Right after Petitioner had
entered his plea on this case on May 24, 2006, Morrison stated that he doubted Petitioner
was mentally capable of understanding the proceedings in court. (R. 207,1J14.)
Petitioner suffers from psychological disorders which have variously been diagnosed as
anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, unspecified learning disorder, and attention-deficit
disorder, many stemming from the loss of his son in 2001. (R. 194-195, ^[17-22; R.
2ll,1fl[l6-l8;R. 115/17-23, 116/1-4.) Due to their impatience with Petitioner's slow
comprehension, Petitioner's defense counsel failed to take adequate time to explain his
plea statement and prior stipulation of dismissal to him. (See R. 193, ^[10-12; R. 209,
1fl4;R. 134-142;.)
10.

Neither counsel ever told Petitioner that they thought he had a good chance of

acquittal before they pressured him to plead guilty. Yet Caine conceded in open court
that good chance of acquittal in this case: "[V]eryfrankly,there were issues that could
have been tried in both [Weber and Davis County] cases that could have arisen in an
acquittal. And the State knew that, and we knew that." (R. 122/23-25 - 123/1-4.)
11.

Neither counsel sought Petitioner's informed consent to agree to the stipulation of

dismissal wherein it mandated that Petitioner later plead guilty to a crime he had
consistently denied committing to counsel. (See R. 192,1fij7-8.) By the time of

Petitioner's plea hearing defense counsel simply advised Petitioner what to say in court.
(SeeR. 193412.)
12.

Petitioner wished to have a trial in the, particularly because he maintained he was

not guilty of sexual abuse of a minor or of lewdness involving a child. (See R. 195, ff 1516.) He entered a guilty plea with the misunderstanding that he was not admitting to the
crime charged. (See R. 195, ^15-16.) In fact, his plea statement did admit to the facts
of the crime. (See R. 192,1flJ7-8.) Had Mr. Petitioner understood this, he would not
have pled no-contest because he maintains to this day that he did not commit the
crime. (SeeR. 192,^7-8.)
13.

Furthermore, the trial court failed to carry its burden of ensuring that Petitioner

understood his time-limited right to appeal or withdraw his plea under Rule 1 l's strict
compliance requirement. The court never asked Petitioner whether he understood his
appeal rights. The court mentioned to Petitioner that he had a right to jury trial, to
cross examination of witnesses against him, to be present at trial, not to testify
himself, and to presumed innocence until proven guilty. (See R. 106/12-23.)
14.

The court then indicated it would go over all of his rights but that it would not

be necessary to "go[] over it and over it and over it unless I need to." (R. 106/20-23.)
Such an offering would not be welcome to many, much less a defendant who is
already visibly intimidated by his attorney and the whole process such that Caine
answered in Petitioner's stead half of the questions posed to Petitioner by the court.

15.

Hence, the court failed to adequately incorporate the plea statement into the

record by showing Petitioner had thoroughly understood it. The trial court simply
relied on representations by defense counsel that Petitioner understood the plea
statement. {See R. 105/23-25 - 109/1-15.)
16.

Due to his psychological conditions, Petitioner had difficulties understanding the

proceedings, the consequences of his plea, and the nature of his constitutional rights. {See
R. 106/12-20; R. 106/20-23; Pltf s Ex. 221; Pltf s Ex. 232.) The trial court failed to
evince any further evidence that Petitioner understood his guilty plea besides a total of
four "yes ma'am" and "no ma'am" answers to her eight questions during the plea
colloquy.

II) SECOND CLAIM - Petitioner's Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel Was Violated Where His Defense Counsel Caine's
Loyalties Were Divided and He Did Not Act as an Effective Advocate to Ensure a
Fair Adversarial Proceeding
A. An Actual Conflict of Interest Existed Where Petitioner's Trial Counsel Caine
Had Divided Loyalties between a Former Client and Petitioner
17.

Caine's former successful defense of the woman accused to

Petitioner's 3-month-old son became a problem in the course of his
representation of Petitioner. When representing Petitioner Caine
exhibited divided loyalty to his own reputation and his former client he
had successfully defended in 2 0 0 1 . {SeeR. 229-239.) Daines was the owner
1

Plaintiffs Exhibit 22 was a letter Petitioner wrote to his mother soon after entering the plea.
Plaintiffs Exhibit 23 was Dr. Victoria D. Burgess' assessment of Petitioner that he did not understand the plea
agreement, admitted as evidence at the evidentiary hearing. This is in the Record but not Bates stamped with page
numbers.
2

and operator of the daycare where Petitioner's 3-month-old son Clancy was shaken to
death. (See R. 231.) In essence, as the parents of the minor victim, Boyd and Natalie
Petitioner were represented by the State in that case in prosecuting their son's death.
(See R. 211,1HJ17-18.) Caine represented the defendant Daines. (See R. 229-239.)
18.

Caine had publicly stated he believed in Jeri Daines' innocence. (See R. 229-239.)

Yet Petitioner wanted to testify as to how her harmful or negligent behavior toward his
son affected his mind and attitude toward children. (See R. 192, ^|4; R. 196, T|22; R. 204,
fflf 11 -14; R. 211,fflf16-19.) Petitioner, his family, and those who knew him in the
community wanted to testify to Petitioner's reputation in the community and how
through Jeri Daines' act or negligence to act to protect his son Petitioner was seen to have
softened even more toward children and became more protective of them. (See R. 192,
f4; R. 196, TJ22; R. 204,fflfl1-14; R. 211, H[16-19.) Such testimony would have been
oppositional and embarrassing to Caine who had vigorously defended Daines' innocence.
(R. 236.) An actual conflict of interest that adversely affected Caine's performance
also exists where Caine had a divided loyalty to his former client, Jeri Daines, such
that Caine's divided loyalty adversely affected Caine's performance where Caine
could not have raised or avoided raising 1) a legitimate argument of Petitioner's
incapacity to hurt a child, or 2) an affirmative defense of Petitioner's mental state.
19.

Such testimony would have been oppositional and embarrassing to Caine who

had vigorously defended Daines' innocence. (See R. 236.) "That case I'm very proud
of. . . . Jeri Daines wasn't just not guilty, she was innocent." (R. 236.) Caine had an

actual conflict from putting Petitioner on the stand because Petitioner would have
testified about his pain toward mistreatment of children due to the pain he suffered
from Jeri Daines' having negligently killed his son. {See R. 192, f4; R. 196, ^|22; R.
204, ^11-14; R. 211, ^[16-19.) This would have been a legitimate argument for
Caine to take with Petitioner, but he made the choice not to go that way, even saying
to Petitioner that he would never put him on the stand because he is too "stupid" and
would not say the "right things." (R. 195, |16; R. 203, | 7 ; R. 208, TJ9; 218,1ffl4-5.)
Instead, Caine convinced Petitioner to take a plea to avoid the embarrassment that
Petitioner's testimony would have caused Caine and the threat it would have posed to
his loyalty to his former client, whose innocence Caine believed in.
20.

Caine and Morrison pressured and coerced Petitioner to take a plea despite the

wishes of Petitioner and his family to testify about the effect of Clancy's murder on
Petitioner and how the abusive and neglectful actions of Caine's former client, Jeri
Daines, rendered Petitioner more sensitive to the harm that can come to a child than ever
before; despite Petitioner's good chance for acquittal; despite Petitioner's repeated
assertion of innocence concerning the underlying charges; despite Petitioner's repeatedly
expressing difficulty in understanding counsels' advice; and explanations of the legal
procedures and consequences.
B. Caine's Failure to Counsel Petitioner of His Option of Going to Trial with the
Insanity or Mental Infirmity Defense Was Due to His Divided Loyalty and
Thus Constitutes Presumed Conflict of Interest which is Prima Facia
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

21.

Caine had to make the choice not to counsel Petitioner of his option to raise the

defense of mental illness. (See R. 66-82; R. 134-135,138; R. 141; R. 196, f22.) This
defense of mental illness or diminished capacity would have been based on
Petitioner's severe clinically diagnosed depression stemming from the death of his son
that he felt was caused by the negligence of Caine's former client, Jeri Daines. (See R.
66-82; R. 134-135,138; R. 141; R. 196, f22.) Caine would not bring up the effects of
Petitioner's severe depression as it was relevant to Petitioner's criminal

responsibility. This was so because Petitioner's depression stemmed
originally from what Petitioner construed as the murder of his son by
Caine's former client, whose innocence Caine believed in.
C. Caine's Coercion of Petitioner Constituted an Actual Conflict of Interest that
Adversely Affected Counsel's Performance and Was Hence Presumed Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
22.

Where Caine coerced Petitioner to accept a plea by misleading Petitioner of his

chances of acquittal, and subjected Petitioner to persuasion and influence such that the
Petitioner's will was overborne, the plea is not only unknowingly and involuntarily
entered and Caine's behavior exhibited a clear and actual conflict of interest. (See R.
199,H33.)
23.

Caine coerced Petitioner to enter a plea of guilty although Petitioner continued

to deny he committed the crimes he was charged with and Caine conceded in open
court that this case as well as the Davis County case could have resulted in acquittals.
(R. 122/23-25 - 123/1-4.) "[V]ery frankly, there were issues that could have been tried

in both cases that could have arisen in an acquittal. And the State knew that, and we
knew that." (R. 122/23-25 - 123/1-4.) Although Caine concluded there was a good
chance of acquittal, Caine urged Petitioner to enter a plea of no contest by promising
him he would "go home sooner." (R. 192-193,ffl[8-l1; R - 209> 1I14-)
24.

Caine took advantage of Petitioner's vulnerable state of mind, mental illness,

and low IQ by exerting his will over Petitioner. Caine did not adequately explain to
Petitioner that by pleading no contest, {see R. 108/15), he was confessing to the
factual elements of sexual abuse of the alleged victim, {see R. 192, ^13-14; R. 197,
f33; R. 202,ffl|5-6;R. 209,ffl|6-7;R. 218, ^5.) Petitioner was visibly intimidated by
Caine. {SeeR. 19544; R. 196, ^|22; R. 204, fflfll-14; R- 209,ffl[6-7;R. 211,1ffll6-l9;
R. 218, TJ5.) Evidence of Caine's dominating and coercive behavior toward Petitioner
in regard to Petitioner's plea can be found at the change of plea hearing on November
1, 2005, where Petitioner was clearly too intimidated to speak without Caine's
prompting him and where Caine answered in Petitioner's stead half of the questions
posed to Petitioner by the court. {See 111/12-13.)
25.

Caine held an adversarial relationship with Petitioner. In the course of this case,

Caine repeatedly charged Petitioner with being "stupid." {See R. 196, ^23; R. 203, ^7;
R. 209,1fl[8-9.) Caine angrily told Petitioner that he had embarrassed him and ruined
his reputation where Caine had been representing Petitioner as if he were innocent.
{SeeR. 197,1J30; R. 219, ffljll, 16.)
26.

Further evidence of Caine's ongoing animosity toward Petitioner is present on

the record at the probation revocation hearing where he characterized for the trial
court that a phone call Petitioner had made to his niece was "the most colossally
stupid thing that Petitioner could have done . . . . " (See R. 125/12-13.)
B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENTS AMOUNT TO MORE THAN
IGNORING THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER DENYING HIS POSTCONVICTION PETITION,
1.) The district court erroneously looked to Petitioner's conduct
at hearings other than the plea hearing to conclude that he
knowingly and intelligently entered his plea.
Petitioner does not ignore the district court's order denying his post-conviction
petition, nor does he seek "de novo review" of the court's order. See State's brief
p. 12. Petitioner looks squarely at the reasoning of the district court's ruling itself in
support of his claim on appeal that the court's conclusion that he knew and understood
what he was doing was not based upon Petitioner's conduct at the plea hearing.
Rather, the district court looks to hearings that took place after the plea hearing, such
as the sentencing hearing and the evidentiary hearing on the post-conviction petition,
to support its finding that "Petitioner did not appear in court as the shy, manipulable
individual that he and his family members portrayed him to be at the evidentiary
hearing." See district court Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
Denying Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein after 'Finding of Fact"), Finding
of Fact #64.

The district court cited Petitioner's behavior of tending to "speak up in court
when he had a concern" at the sentencing hearing. See Finding of Fact #65. The
court pointed out that Petitioner went so far as to "interrupt" in areas of particular
concern to him. See Finding of Fact #65. The court even relies upon Petitioner's
behavior in the tape recorded phone conversation between he and his niece, occurring
through the jail a substantial period of time after the plea and initial sentencing. See
Finding of Fact #67.
The district court also singled out Petitioner's written "statement" given to
Adult Probation and Parole in preparing for his sentencing hearing to support the
conclusion that he "understood the elements of second degree felony sexual abuse of a
child and how the State's evidence against him related to that charge." See Finding of
Fact #70. The problem with the court's reliance upon this written statement is that
such a statement is not prepared in the presence of the agent of Adult Probation and
Parole. There is absolutely no way of knowing what assistance Petitioner may have
had in the preparation of the statement, or whether or not someone else prepared the
statement altogether. In fact, in light of Petitioner's IQ, estimated by the district court
to be in either "'the borderline range'" or "'in the Below Average Intelligence
Category,'" of somewhere between 74 and 80 (See Finding of Fact #78 and 79) it is
unlikely that Petitioner wrote the statement, at the literacy level it demonstrates,
without at least significant assistance.

The only action indicating understanding on Petitioner's part at the time he
entered the plea was nodding of the head. See Finding of Fact #62 and 63. These
facts, when marshaled as required, clearly do not support the district court's
conclusion that Petitioner knew and understood the nature and gravity of the offense
to which he entered a plea, much less the nuances of a "no contest" plea.
Not only do the facts not support the court's conclusion, they actually support
the opposite conclusion, that Petitioner did not know and understand the consequences
of his plea. Petitioner's behavior in court is characterized by the district court at times
other than the plea hearing to be more outgoing and inquisitive. During the plea
hearing, however, his behavior is reduced to nods with little or no verbal
augmentation. In light of the typical behavior described by the court, Petitioner's
behavior at the plea hearing is more consistent with a lack of understanding or with
some form of intimidation.
2.) The district court improperly relied upon Petitioner's
employment, ownership of a vehicle and living on his
own to conclude that he knowingly and intelligently
entered the plea of guilty.
The State and the district court point to the fact that Petitioner had employment
at Hill Air Force Base, that he graduated from high school, and that he owned a home
and vehicle to demonstrate Petitioner's ability to understand the charges, his options,
the rights he was forfeiting. However, neither the court nor the state indicate the type
of job Petitioner held or whether only rote memorization was required which would

require only a low IQ. As a result, this information is of little or no value in
determining Petitioner's ability to think in the abstract or even his cognitive level in
general.
Petitioner's employers wrote statements to assist him at sentencing that
indicated Petitioner was a good employee, but did not address the details of what he
did or what level of education or intelligence was required for his position. The
amount of pay cannot be relied upon to conclude the nature of the work because
certain levels of pay are required by government agencies and government contractors
hoping to do business with the government. Furthermore, many low IQ individuals
are able to do very well in jobs that involve rote actions. Because of the lack of
supporting foundation, Petitioner's employment should not be considered whatsoever
in determining whether he knowingly and intelligently entered the plea, particularly in
light of the court's specific finding of petitioner's low IQ.
3) The district court failed to recognize that counsel's ineffective
assistance manifested itself in counsel's presumption that Petitioner
failed to answer certain questions and made certain statements
because he willfully chose not to> rather than that he could not due
to his mental state and possible incompetence.
As argued in Petitioner's opening brief, a defendant has a right to conflict free
assistance of counsel in his or her defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063, 80 L.Ed2d 674 (1984), and State v. Webb, 790 P.2d
65, 72 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct at 2065).

The district court found, based on the testimony of Petitioner's surviving
counsel, that counsel's continued attempt to get petitioner to answer certain key
questions regarding the case was willful on petitioner's part. See Finding of Fact #89
and 90. Further, a very unusual statement made by Petitioner when he was asked how
he would plead and responded by asking why he had to so anything, was interpreted
as being unwilling to make decisions when confronted with options he did not like.
See Finding of Fact #91. In fact, these incidents could very easily indicate a very
serious mental illness or mental deficit. Both counsel and the court conceded that
Petitioner is "slow." See Finding of Fact # 93.
Neither the court, nor counsel are mental health experts and the fact that they
chose to interpret the above referenced actions as willful on Petitioner's part
demonstrates their bias against Petitioner. A defendant can become incompetent at
any time throughout the proceedings and Petitioner's competence at the time of the
plea is the relevant question.
Ill,

CONCLUSION

Petitioner's demonstrated low IQ combined with questions regarding his
mental condition place him in a vulnerable position to accept Mr. Morrison's advice
to add Mr. Caine to the case, despite Petitioner's concerns. This combined with the
concerns about Petitioner's mental state at the plea demonstrate that the plea was not
knowing and voluntary and that counsel's assistance was not effective and free of any

conflict of interest. Furthermore, the court's extensive discussion of what a great plea
arrangement petitioner received does not make any difference to these concerns.
For the State to speculate that petitioner only now that Petitioner is in prison
does he claim he did not understand the plea is unfair. His actions are equally
indicative of one who did not understand the process nor his right to appeal and,
therefore, is left with only the recourse of a post-conviction petition.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of June, 2009.
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This case is before the court on the remaining issues arising out of Petitioner's Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief An evidentiary hearing on these issues was held before the court on
November 26, 2007 where all parties were represented by counsel At the conclusion of the
evidence, the parties counsel agreed to submit their closing arguments in writing to the court
which the court has now reviewed.
Specifically, the remaining issues to be determined fall under two categories. The first is
whether defendant's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered including whether there was
ineffective assistance of counsel. The second is whether petitioner received ineffective
assistance of counsel at the time he entered his plea due to a conflict of interest.
The background facts supporting the court's decision are as follows:
1. Petitioner was charged in Weber County with Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a Child a 1st
degree felony on or about April 22, 2004.
2. Petitioner was represented throughout the proceedings by attorneys John Caine, now
deceased, and William Morrison.
3. During this time petitioner was also charged in Davis County with a felony sex offense
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against a child.
4. The victim in the Davis County case was not the same victim as in Weber County.
5. John Caine and William Morrison represented petitioner in the Davis County case also.
6. Before petitioner was charged with these offenses, petitioner's son died while in the care of a
daycare center in either Weber or Davis County.
7. The operator of the daycare center, Ms. Daines, was charged with murder.
8. John Caine represented Ms. Daines in that case.
9. Ms. Daines was acquitted of the charge.
10. Petitioner and his family retained William Morrison to represent petitioner in the sex crime
cases in both Davis and Weber Counties apparently because Mr. Morrison was also representing
petitioner and his family in a wrongful death civil case against Ms. Daines.
11. William Morrison suggested that the family retain John Caine to act as co-counsel for
petitioner in the criminal cases because he was impressed with Mr. Caine's ability as a criminal
defense attorney having spent a considerable time reviewing the record of Mr. Caine's
performance in the criminal case against Ms. Daines..
12. Mr. Morrison testified that he recognized that the petitioner may have some animosity
toward Mr. Caine because he represented Ms. Daines who had allegedly murdered petitioner's
son.
13. However, petitioner and his family agreed to have Mr. Caine act as co-counsel in this case
presumably because of Mr. Caine's excellent ability as a criminal defense attorney and in Mr.
Morrison's words "the family and Boyd were okay with it."
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14. After nearly a year and a half, petitioner entered a plea of no contest to Sexual Abuse of a
Minor a 2nd degree felony in Weber County.
15. In conjunction with that plea, counsel for the defense and the state approached the court
with a proposed agreement that in exchange for a no contest plea the court would impose
probation rather than a prison term and, if jail was imposed, the state would not object to work
release.
16. The court agreed that, absent some unexpected discovery in the presentence report revealing
other sex offenses, or the like, the court would go along with the sentencing recommendations as
outlined.
17. In conjunction with that, the court was adamant that the victim's family would have to agree
to the resolution.
18. The state assured the court that the family was agreeable with the recommendation and
specifically that the father of the victim was mainly concerned, at that point, that petitioner
(defendant) would plead to an offense that would require him to register with the Sex Offender
Registry.
19. There was never a suggestion that the victim's family would not allow the victim to testify if
the case proceeded to trial.
20. In both the Davis and Weber county cases, defendant consistently maintained that he was
innocent of the charges.
21. While the two criminal cases involved different victims, both had similar fact scenarios
alleged, specifically, that the victim was sitting on defendant's lap with other people in the area
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and that defendant placed his hand down the pants of the victim and fondled her private parts.

DECISION
The court has previously entered its decision on the issue regarding the probation violation.
The remaining issues addressed at the evidentiary hearing are:

1. Did petitioner enter his plea knowingly and voluntarily? As part of this issue petitioner
claims that the court conducted an inadequate plea colloquy which resulted in the failure of
petitioner to knowingly and voluntarily enter his plea. In addition petitioner claims that counsel
intimidated him into entering a plea instead of proceeding to trial. While not part of the original
petition, petitioner now alleges, in addition, that petitioner was incompetent to enter a plea, and
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to recognize the incompetence and request a
competency hearing..

2. Did petitioner's trial counsel have a conflict of interest that resulted in prejudice to the
petitioner? As part of this issue, petitioner claims that he had a mental infimiity defense that he
was not advised of as a result of the alleged conflict of interest, and petitioner was coerced into
pleading guilty by counsel not adequately explaining the consequences of the plea and by counsel
making derogatory remarks to petitioner.
The court gives its decision as follows and necessarily makes findings of fact based on the
evidentiary hearing which are incorporated herein.
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As to the first issue, the standard for determining whether a plea has been knowing and
voluntarily entered does not turn on whether there was a Rule 11 violation in taking the plea.
Petitioner's argument that the court did not properly conduct a full Rule 11 colloquy with
petitioner is not a sufficient basis for granting post conviction relief Rather the standard is
whether the defendant at the time he entered his plea did so, in fact, knowingly and voluntarily.
That is not to say that the events surrounding the taking of the plea, including the colloquy,
are not important in the context of determining whether the plea was voluntarily and knowingly
entered. However, if there was a Rule 11 violation, it is not presumptive that there was a
problem with the plea in this kind of proceeding.
In the instant case, at the plea hearing, the court determined that defense counsel, Mr. Came,
read the statement in support of plea verbatim to the defendant. When the court asked defendant
whether he had read the plea statement, Mr. Caine informed the court that he had read it verbatim
line by line. At that time defendant is observed on the video tape nodding his head in agreement.
The court then asked defendant if he understood what was read to him. The defendant
acknowledged that he did in fact understand. The court acknowledged that the plea agreement
recited defendant's rights as well as stated the elements of the offense. The court then
summarized the rights included in the statement but did not go through all the rights enumerated
in Rule 11 since the plea agreement did that. The defendant was then asked if he wanted the
court to go through what was contained in the plea statement. Defendant said he did not and
once again acknowledged that he did in fact understand the contents of the plea statement. He
also acknowledges signing it. At a later point during the plea proceeding, the court asked Mr.
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Caine if he had any reason to think defendant didn't understand what was going on and Mr.
Caine responded: "Not at all."
Petitioner now asserts that Mr. Caine did not read the entire statement to him but rather
skipped over parts of it saying that certain parts were not applicable. Apparently at the time the
statement was read to petitioner, only Mr. Caine and petitioner were present. Petitioner claims
that his attorneys just told him that if he did what they told him to do that he'd be able to go
home to his family and it would be over. He testified at the post conviction evidentiary hearing
that he did not understand that he had a right to a trial and that he was presumed innocent. He
claims he did not understand what probation was; just that he would have to talk to cops and see
them at certain time. He also claims that Mr. Caine said there would be no jail.
Petitioner also claimed in the Davis County case, in his post conviction petition there, that the
plea statement was not read to him in that case. Mr. Morrison, the counsel who was primarily
handling the case in Davis County, testified at the post conviction hearing in Weber County that
he had in fact spent considerable time going over the statement with the defendant and had in fact
read it line by line to him.
Unfortunately, Mr. Caine was not available to testify since he died shortly before the post
conviction hearing in Weber County. That notwithstanding, given all the evidence presented to
the court, the court finds that petitioner's claim that the statement was not read to him is false.
He nodded when the court asked if the statement was read to him, he acknowledged to the court
twice that he understood the plea statement, he made the same false claim in Davis County, and
did not raise this issue until after he violated probation and was sent to prison. Mr. Caine
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affirmatively represented to the court, twice, that he had read the statement to petitioner.
Petitioner's claim that the statement was not read to him is simply not credible.
Defendant's claim that he did not understand that he had a right to a trial and that he had a
presumption of innocence is also not credible since the court specifically pointed out those rights
to defendant at the time of the plea. The court stated:

"You have a right to a trial in the case, a

right to have counsel cross examine all the witnesses that would be brought in against you. You
have a right to be present at trial when the witnesses testify against you. You have a right to a
jury trial, and that's what was scheduled in the case. You have a right not to testify at your trial,
and you're presumed innocent of the offense until proven otherwise, and a jury will be so
instructed." To this the defendant stated that he understood.
Petitioner's affidavit in support of his petition also shows that he understood the nature of the
proceedings. The affidavit states that he told his attorneys that he wanted to go to trial and call
witnesses including himself and his daughter to testify.
It can also be inferred from petitioner's actions and words that he understood the potential
penalties in the case. He readily interrupted the court at sentencing to ask that he be given work
release which demonstrates that he anticipated going to jail. He certainly did not show any
surprise or outrage that he was going to jail rather than just being sent home to be with his family
as he claims he expected.
Petitioner cannot also now credibly claim that he was bullied into entering a plea by his
attorneys or the court. As the State cogently describes in their written closing argument:
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Petitioner's behavior at his court appearances belie his current attempt to
portray himself as a shy, manipulable follower. At the plea hearing, petitioner
was not looking to Mr.Caine for cues. Petitioner did not hesitate to answer the
Court's questions or indicate his agreement or answers by nodding his head. At
the plea hearing, as weli as his other court appearances petitioner did not hesitate
to initiate conversations with his attorneys, to answer the Court's questions, or
even interrupt the Court and express concerns.

Petitioner's character and assertiveness is also demonstrated graphically in his taped sexually
explicit conversation with his minor niece which constituted the probation violation. His
questions, comments, and suggestiveness to his niece border on bullying and certainly do not
demonstrate a meek, easily manipulated, shy person. Quite the contrary.
The court also took a factual basis for the plea from the state. Because the defendant was
entering a no contest plea, the court asked the state to proffer what their evidence would be at the
time of trial. The state proffers that the victim would testify that "(the defendant) picked her up,
placed her on his lap, put his hand down the front of her pants on the bare skin, and touched her
genitals." The child was six years old. The defendant entered a no contest plea at which time the
court found that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered, and the state had offered
sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction in the case. The court went on to
acknowledge that there would be recommendations for formal probation and not an initial prison
term, however, the court also informed defendant that if he violated probation any
recommendations for no prison would not come into play. Mr. Caine also stated the agreement
he had reached with the state for a recommendation to the court and acknowledged that if jail
time was imposed there would be a recommendation for work release.
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Based on the above, it is clear that the court properly incorporated the plea statement into the
record in support of defendant's plea of no contest and the plea statement had been read to
petitioner in its entirety and he signed it. Any claim that the plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered cannot be based on the failure of the court and counsel to advise petitioner of
his rights.
The next related issue is petitioner's claim that he was not competent to enter his plea, despite
his statements to the court that he understood what was going on, and that counsel was
ineffective for not recognizing this and asking for a competency hearing. This issue is more
factually complex and a determination of the validity of petitioner's claim hinges on a host of
factors.
The standard for determining incompetence to proceed is set forth in Utah Code. Ann. § 7715-2:
(A) person is incompetent to proceed if he is suffering from a mental disorder
or mental retardation resulting either in :
(1) his inability to have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings
against him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged; or
(2) his inability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.
it is undisputed in this case that counsel did not request a competency hearing. It is also the
observation of this court that the judge did not note anything that would have triggered in her
mind a need for a competency hearing. At the time of the plea, defendant acknowledged that he
understood the plea statement which contained both a recitation of the elements of the offense,
the potential penalties, and the rights he was giving up by entering his plea. Counsel
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acknowledged at the time of the plea that there was no reason to think defendant did not
understand.
Significantly, Mr. Morrison testified at the post conviction hearing that he and Mr. Caine met
with defendant and his family members before the plea was entered where Mr. Caine outlined the
various options available to defendant by writing them out on a blackboard. The risks of
proceeding to trial were spelled out as was the possibility of life in prison if defendant was
convicted at trial. Mr. Morrison acknowledged that both he and Mr. Caine were willing to
proceed to a jury trial if defendant wanted that. Mr. Morrison also acknowledged that both he
and Mr. Caine strongly urged defendant to plead no contest to the lesser charge given that he had
a 50-50 chance of being found guilty at trial. Their advice, simply put, was that he would be a
"fool" to reject the plea bargain which carried with it a very lenient recommendation of probation
rather than prison. Mr. Morrison went on to state that he considered the plea bargain a "victory"
in light of the difficulty they would have overcoming a young victim's testimony at trial where
there was no motive to lie. Furthermore, the progress they had made in negotiating with the
prosecution was tremendous given that the State originally was unwilling to make any kind of
deal. Mr. Morrison also testified that if he were to counsel petitioner today his
advice would be the same-take the plea deal.
Mr. Morrison also testified that it was his observation that defendant understood the charge
and the potential penalties. Petitioner's characterization of Mr. Morrison's testimony and
demeanor as being defensive, self-protective, and lashing out is not accurate. The court does not
view Mr. Morrison's testimony that way at all. The court would characterize Mr. Morrison's
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testimony as objective and credible. Mr. Morrison testified that the only difficulty counsel had
with defendant was that defendant would become uncooperative when he was confronted with
either questions he did not want to answer or confronted with the limitations of options available
to him. For instance, defendant would act like he did not understand what they were saying when
confronted with the question of how the victim got on his lap in the first place. Since this was a
question that the State would "hammer on" at trial, as defense counsel they wanted to know how
to counter it, but, they simply could not get him to answer that question. Also when confronted
with the option of how he would plead, defendant would keep asking why he had to do anything.
It was counsel's impression that when the defendant did not like the question asked or was
confronted with options he was unwilling to choose from he would become recalcitrant. It was at
those times that Mr. Morrison acknowledged counsel would become frustrated with defendant,
although he does not recall any time that names were called.
Mr. Morrison further testified that he simply did not see any signs that defendant suffered
from a diminished capacity or incompetence. Mr. Morrison further noted that defendant
graduated from high school and held a job at Hill Air Force Base paying $23.00 per hour. While
defendant was "slow" Mr. Morrison testified that they did not feel they could meet the significant
burden of showing a diminished capacity and that issue was discussed between counsel.

In short, based on Mr. Morrison's testimony, it is clear to the court that counsel noted that
defendant was somewhat slow but that his capacity did not rise to the level of diminished
capacity in a legal sense. Counsel concluded that while defendant could be recalcitrant in areas
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that he did not want to address or acknowledge, he understood the charge and penalties
associated with it.
There is a great deal of other evidence which corroborates Mr. Morrison's observations and
conclusions. Those will be listed as follows:

1. Neither petitioner nor petitioner's family ever told the court or counsel that petitioner was
incapable of understanding or that he did not understand not until petitioner had been sentenced
to prison on the probation violation that is.

2. In May of 2004 prior to the plea, Dr. Rick Hawks conducted a Psychological, Sexual
Behavioral, and Risk Assessment of petitioner which consisted of a test including 2000 questions
which petitioner was able to complete. The results showed that petitioner was "faking good"
meaning that he was dissimulating-attempting to make himself look better than he was,
minimizing, and otherwise not accurately answering all the questions to reflect his true state.
This conduct is similar to that which Mr. Moirison observed and which is described above. The
tests administered also contain an internal component which allow a check to detemiine whether
someone doesn't understand or is just randomly answering questions. The results showed that
petitioner understood the test and the questions. Although the examination done by Dr. Hawks
was not performed to detemiine competency the fact that petitioner was able to complete the
exam shows a minima] level of competency. It should be noted however that the testing also
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showed that petitioner had a low IQ falling in the borderline range.

3. In the presentence report prepared after petitioner entered his no contest plea, petitioner's
written statement makes it clear that petitioner knew what he was charged with. In his own
words he states as follows:
"(The victim's) claim is that I put her on my lap and put my hands down inside
her levis, and fondled her. It would be very difficult to put anyone's hands in side
a childs pants while they are sitting on your lap with out having the pants
unbuttoned and unzipped. Especially with a child and my large hands. My
feelings about this is that it did not happen."
Petitioner's counsel insinuates in closing argument that because the statement was typed, and,
petitioner was likely not capable of typing it, that the statement is not his own. The problem with
this argument is that petitioner specifically stated at the hearing that the statement was in fact his
own. Clearly, petitioner identifies the essential elements of the offense he was charged with and
even articulates a defense of impossibility to the charge.

4. Attached to the presentence report are two letters from petitioner's employer which state the
following:

"Mr. Boyd Peterson has proven to be a valuable asset to the Airborne Generator
Flight mission in support of the United States Air Force. Working as a contractor
for several years within our organization, his professionalism and dedication was
recognized with his selection as a full-time Government employee in February
2005. He continues to display those same attributes on a daily basis and we feel
very fortunate to have him as a valued member of our Air Force Team."
(Undated, signed by William M. Tews, Flight Chief, Airborne Generators)
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A second letter of recommendation states:
"I've had the opportunity to work with Mr. Boyd Peterson for the past two years.
During that time Boyd lias proven to be an excellent employee. He is timely,
reliable and completes any work assigned in a professional manner. He works
well with his peers and has had no disciplinary action taken against him."
(Undated, signed by Larry D. Ballard, Flight Chief, Ground Powers System)

Both of these letters do not comment on an individual who is incapable of understanding things.
They are inconsistent with petitioner's claims now that "I don't understand what people tell me"
or that he is mentally retarded.

5. Also attached to the presentence report are a series of letters from petitioner's family that
reflect that petitioner understood his options and made a reasoned choice to enter a no contest
plea. Nowhere in those communications do family members express their concern that petitioner
didn't understand what he was doing. Excerpts from those letters are as follows;

Letter from Gail and Earl Peterson (mother and father):
"Boyd's attorney said there is a 50-50 chance of losing this case, and Boyd chose
to take a plea rather than a chance of leaving his family and going to prison."

Letter from Michael Peterson (brother):
"Taking a plea was the best of two choices for his family. Having to have his
oldest daughter testify in court... after all she has suffered in her young life, he
really felt the choice was to prevent any further pain to her. Therefore he took a
plea. This was a hard decision but knowing the trauma it would cause for her
having to be in court again was more than he could endure or have her face."
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6. The court handed down petitioner's sentence on the no contest plea consistent with what it
had indicated it would do-suspended prison with a jail sentence and work release along with
formal probation. Neither petitioner nor his family raised the issue that petitioner didn't
understand what he had plead to nor did they raise an issue that he thought he was simply going
to be able to go home to his family rather than go to jail.

7. The first indication to the court that petitioner was claiming a problem with the manner in
which his plea was taken was after his probation was revoked and he was sent to prison for
violating the terms of his probation specifically by making a sexually explicit phone call to his
underage niece from the jail. A letter petitioner wrote to his mother (Exhibit 22) although
undated indicates that "I did not understand what no contest meant." That letter was written by
petitioner while he was in prison, long after the entry of his plea.

8. While in the jail awaiting sentencing on his probation violation, Dr. Rick Hawk.es was asked
to visit him to review mental health issues. Petitioner reported at that time that he was having a
total mental breakdown, that he couldn't think straight, and that he didn't even know who he
was. The jail according to Dr. Hawkes was not treating petitioner as having a serious mental
breakdown, and it was Dr. Hawkes observation that this was not a true mental breakdown.
Rather, petitioner was saying things such as: "IT1 do whatever I can to get out" and "If I don't get
out I'll kill myself." Dr. Hawkes interpreted these threats as simply efforts to manipulate his
surroundings.
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The evidence presented at the postconviction hearing in support of petitioner's claims of
incompetence consisted of testimony from family members who stated they did not think
petitioner understood what was going on, even though they never told anyone including the court
this, and a psychologist, Dr. Victoria Burgess who examined petitioner over a year after he
entered his plea. The family members' testimony is not consistent with the letters sent to the
court in connection with the presentence report quoted above. In those letters they clearly
understood and reflected that petitioner understood that by taking the plea he was choosing
between the lesser of two evils, by avoiding a prison sentence initially anyway.

Even their

testimony regarding petitioner asking the same questions over and over again is consistent with
Mr. Morrison's observations that petitioner repeatedly asked why he had to do anything despite
their telling him repeatedly what his options were. Mr. Morrison's conclusion was that petitioner
was avoiding the inevitable and avoiding reality by repeating the questions. He simply did not
want to understand because he did not like his choices. Ultimately, however, he did make a
choice to plead no contest; a choice that was described in the family letters above.
As for Dr. Burgess' testimony and report, the court notes that the standard she applied for
incompetence really does not meet the statutory standard quoted at the outset of this decision.
Dr. Burgess concludes that petitioner would "have some difficulty disclosing pertinent facts,
events and states of mind. He would have an extremely difficult time comprehending and
appreciating the range and nature of possible penalties that may be imposed in the proceedings
against him and engaging in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options. Therefore, Boyd
Peterson was not competent to enter a plea of no contest. It is all best summed up in Boyd
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Peterson's own words, CI did not want to go to jail and I wanted to return to my family. I listen to
people because they are smarter than me."'
The legal standard is not that someone would have difficulty with the tasks identified above
but that they are unable to do them. Furthermore, Dr. Burgess did not review the videotape of
the plea nor did she consult with petitioner's counsel, both important sources of information as to
petitioner's state of mind at the time he entered his plea. Instead Dr. Burgess talked with
petitioner's mother, administered some basic psychological tests, and appears to have relied
primarily on petitioner's own self serving assessment. Petitioner's mantra at the post conviction
relief hearing was " I just don't understand what people tell me." That statement is plainly
disingenuous. Taken at face value it may appear to support a conclusion that petitioner was
incompetent to enter a plea, and his attorneys should have recognized it. The problem is that it
not true. This was a grown man, albeit with a low IQ ,who had and supported a family, held a
good paying job at Hill Air Force Base, was buying a home, was able to drive a car and
presumably pass a driver's test, and who functioned day to day in an apparently adequate, nomial
way. He gave no indication to the court that he was incompetent. His attorneys apparently did
not recognize any signs that he was incompetent. A low IQ and even mental retardation do not
automatically result in an assessment of incompetence. The totality of the circumstances and
observations of everyone involved at the time of his plea lead to an opposite conclusion.

Given

all these factors, it cannot be said that petitioner's counsel was ineffective for not asking for a
competency hearing.
The second issue concerns whether petitioner's counsel Mr. Caine had a conflict of interest.
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The standard for determining whether counsel had a conflict of interest is that the conflict must
be actual and must have negatively affected counsel's performance in such a way that counsel
sought to advance his own interests rather than his client's. State v. Lovell 984 P.2d 382 (Utah
1999).
In the instant case, Mr. Caine, one of petitioner's attorneys, had previously represented Ms.
Daines who was charged with murdering petitioner's son while he was in her care. That person
was acquitted of the charge. Mr. Morrison testified that petitioner and his family agreed to have
Mr. Caine act as co-counsel and represent petitioner in this case.

Therefore, petitioner waived

any conflict of interest claim.
Secondly, there does not appear to be any actual conflict of interest. As Mr. Morrison
testified, they were two unrelated cases.
Even assuming that there may have been a conflict of interest, there is no showing that Mr.
Caine acted in a way that adversely affect petitioner in his representation. Petitioner claims that
Mr. Came would not have been willing to allow him to testify that he never would have been
able to hurt a child because his own son had been murdered because Mr. Caine still had a loyalty
to Ms. Daines who he supposedly believed was innocent. The problem with this argument is that
it simply does not follow that Mr. Caine's defense of Ms. Daines would have precluded him from
presenting testimony in petitioner's case that petitioner was depressed at his son's death and held
the belief that his son had been murdered. Furthermore, it would not have precluded petitioner
from testifying that this condition would prevent petitioner from hurting a child. The connection
that petitioner is trying to make between the two cases is a non sequitur.
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While petitioner's counsel may have discouraged him from testifying, Mr. Morrison pointed
out that the reason was not due to Mr. Caine's representation of Ms. Daines, but rather stemmed
from the concern that the Davis County case pending against petitioner may have become
relevant in the instant case if the character defense was raised. Specifically, raising this kind of
character defense could have opened the door to evidence of the details of the Davis County case
which was strikingly similar to the instant one. As Mr. Morrison testified, if evidence of the
Davis County case would have been allowed into evidence because of the character defense
petitioner claims he wanted to raise, the result would have been devastating to petitioner's
credibility in front of a jury.
As far as Mr. Caine's alleged conflict because of a reluctance to assert a diminished capacity
or insanity defense, Mr. Morrison testified that they, as petitioner's counsel, did explore this
possibility but felt that it did not have viability. Furthermore, as the State points out, the defense
assumes that the alleged conduct occurred, something that petitioner has consistently denied.
in sum, petitioner has not met his burden of showing a conflict of interest. Even if one were
to find a conflict, however, it cannot be reasonably said to have affected counsel's performance.
Instead, Mr. Caine negotiated a very favorable plea agreement, approved by the court in advance,
which virtually guaranteed probation and avoided a very real potential of a life sentence in
prison.
Furthermore, the credibility of petitioner and his family who testified is severely
compromised. Petitioner is desperate to be released from prison after his serious probation
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violation landed him there. He does not want to be in jail or prison and, as he stated in March of
2006, he would do anything to get out. Petitioner's family is also desperate to see petitioner
released. They have supported petitioner from the beginning of the case, even denying the
serious nature of petitioner's probation violation which victimized petitioner's brother's own
minor daughter and his mother's granddaughter. Even to this day they continue to characterize
the sexual deviance of petitioner in the probation violation as a "joke" or an attempt to make the
young lady feel pretty. They are in serious denial as is the petitioner.
The Petition for Post Conviction release is denied. That State will review its proposed
Findings of Fact and include any portions of this opinion that are not included.

JlOO?
DATED this

day of]

PAMELA G. HEFFEKNAN
District Court Judge

Decision
Peterson vs. State
Case Number 060906594 RN
Page Twenty-One

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and coirect copy of the foregoing Decision, first class
mail and postage prepaid, to the following parties this Lr ',, day of January, 2008.

Kimberly Trupiano
Attorney for Plaintiff
111 East 5600 South, Suite 305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107

Christopher Ballard
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
P.O.Box 14084
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

^),U{tM*l

^

In court Cler!

